Vault risk brief — 0xDEAD…0001

Generated 2026-05-16 20:59 UTC · block 19,500,001 · 1 markets · 3 borrowers analyzed
Total assets
5,000,000 (units / 1e6)
HHI
0.421
Top-1 share
60.0%
Markets
1

Counterfactual risk dashboard

OracleFreezeReplay OK
0.0%
fraction_bad_debt
If the oracle freezes while collateral drifts -10%, 0.0% of outstanding debt (0 positions) crosses the bad-debt frontier — LTV > 0.952 at LIF 5% — meaning seized collateral could not cover debt-plus-incentive even once the oracle updates.
CollateralCascade CRITICAL
100.0%
fraction_liquidatable_debt
At a -20% collateral shock, 100.0% of debt becomes liquidatable; liquidity gap (debt minus idle supply) is 0 loan-asset units across affected markets.
DepositorExitShock CRITICAL
96.7%
fraction_rationed
If top-1 depositor(s) exit, demand is 3,000,000,000,000 vs idle supply 100,000,000,000 → 96.7% would be queue-rationed until borrowers repay.
UtilizationInversion CRITICAL
100.0%
fraction_markets_above_target
1 / 1 markets are above the 92% utilization band — IRM curves enter the steep regime; depositor withdrawal pressure compounds.
LiquidationLatency OK
0.0%
fraction_unprofitable_to_liquidate
At 30 gwei and ETH $3500, liquidation cost is ~$36.75; 0.0% of debt sits in 1 position where liquidator profit (debt × 5%) is below cost — these accrue bad-debt risk during oracle-shock windows.
LTVDistributionStress CRITICAL
100.0%
fraction_debt_within_5pp_of_lltv
100.0% of outstanding debt sits within 5 percentage points of LLTV. Top-5% LTV avg: 85.45%. A small adverse oracle move would push this debt into liquidation.

Sensitivity sweeps

Collateral cascade — % debt liquidatable vs shock magnitude
Oracle freeze — % bad debt vs collateral drift while stale
Borrower LTV histogram (count of positions)
Liquidation latency — % unprofitable vs gas price

Per-market state

MarketSupplyBorrow UtilizationLLTVSupply cap
0x0000ef34e2fc…5,000,000,000,0004,900,000,000,00098.0%86%5,000,000,000,000

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